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The Legacy of Colonialism: Law and
Women's Rights in India
Varsha Chitnis*
Danaya Wright**

Abstract
The relationshipbetween nineteenth century EnglandandcolonialIndia
was complex in terms of negotiatingthe different constituencies that claimed
an interest in the economic and moraldevelopment of the colonies. After India
became subject to the sovereignty of the English Monarchy in 1858, itsfuture
became indelibly linked with that ofEngland's,yet India's own unique history
and culture meant that many of the reforms the colonialistsset out to undertake
worked out differently than they anticipated. In particular,the colonial
ambition of civilizing the barbaricnative Indian male underlay many of the
legal reforms attempted in the nearly hundredyears between 1858 andIndia's
independence in 194 7. This Article looks at three areasof law reform in India
affecting women's rights that were closely modeled on reforms in English law:
changes in age of consent laws, changes in widow inheritance laws, and
changes in abortionlaws. Thefirst two occurredin the nineteenth century and
the last in the twentieth century, post-independence, yet the changes in
abortion law still bore indelible traces ofcolonial authority. We explore ways
in which, despite the change in legal sovereignty, the colonial influences that
characterizedthe unsteady alliances and interests between colonial rulers,
native elite men, andBritish women infused the law reforms with patriarchal
and colonial values. In particular,we argue that the custom of adopting
English laws to deal with unique Indian situations,without understandingthe
different culture and history, meant that many of the reforms within India
either promoted British interests orfrustratedthe interests of Indian women.
This Article offers new insights by exploring the interplay ofBritishfeminists
and activists in law reform movements that usually are studied only from the
* Visiting Scholar in the Center on Children and Families at the University of Florida
Levin College of Law.
** Professor of Law at the University of Florida Levin College of Law.
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perspective of colonialmale rulersand native male elites. By focusing on the
situationofindian women andaddingthe perspective ofBritishfeminists, this
Article highlights numerous ways in which colonial women undermined the
reforms of their Indian counterparts.
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I. Introduction
Pre-colonial India was characterized by a pluralistic and fragmented
cultural, religious, and political structure in which there was no monolithic
Hindu, Muslim, or Christian authority.' Multiple tribes, castes, sects, and
family groupings crossed religious and political lines, creating a heterogeneous
population that may have had a definite notion of authority but no
corresponding notion of legality. 2 Much of the law of the period was
customary, with adjudication within segregated communities, which gave rise
to a common interpretation by outsiders that pre-colonial India lacked law
1. See FLAViA AGNES,

LAW AND GENDER INEQUALrrY: THE POLMCS OF WOMEN'S RIGHTs

IN INDIA 12 (1999) ("Plurality of laws and customs and a non-state legal structure were the
essential characteristics of the ancient Indian communities."). For a good general history of
law's effects on women in colonial India, see generally JANAKI NAIR, WOMEN AND LAW IN
COLONIAL INDIA: A SOCIAL HISTORY (2000).
2. See NAmR, supranote 1, at 22 ("[S]cholars argued that although there was a definite
notion of 'authority,' there was no commensurate notion of 'legality."'); see also Elizabeth
Kolsky, Codificationand the Rule ofColonialDifference: CriminalProcedurein BritishIndia,

23 L. & HIST. REv. 631, 652 (2005) (noting that some British reformers described India as a
"country singularly empty of law").
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altogether.3 When the East India Company acquired the right to collect revenue
in Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa in 1765, the company had to devise a new political
and legal structure for the newly-acquired dominions.4 British colonial rule in
India began primarily as a political expedient through this quasi-private entity,
the East India Company, to reap the benefits of imperialism without setting up a
fully functioning sovereign state.5 Colonial rule changed dramatically after
1858, when the company's rule was replaced by the Crown as the legal
sovereign. 6 Throughout the Victorian period, colonial authority was largely
premised on an ideology of the civilizing mission, both in Indian and English
terms.7 Within India, the company claimed legitimacy through its mission of
defeating and replacing the Mughal rulers, who had been the source of
aristocratic power and succession. 8 Legitimacy was gained for the English
population at home through the self-proclaimed role of "civilizing" the natives
by initiating reforms which represented the enlightenment spirit of the British,
the harbingers of progress and modernity. 9
After the transfer of power to the English Crown in 1858, there were two
competing groups vying for political and legal legitimacy within India: the
British colonial authorities and the native male elite.' 0 In the ebb and flow of
political bargaining, the colonial governors generally ceded authority in family
law matters to the customary and/or canonical law of the dominant religions,
3. See W.H. Rattigan, CustomaryLaw in India, 10 LAw MAG. & L. REv. 1,3-4(5th ser.
1884-1885) (describing the unwritten customary law of Indian villages).
4. See NAIR, supra note 1, at 19 (noting the East India Company's desire to fashion a
"legal-juridical apparatus" to control the Bengali revenues the company was granted in 1765).
5. See Jana Tschurenev, Between Non-interference in Matters of Religion and the
CivilizingMission: The ProhibitionofSuttee in 1829, in COLONIALISM AS CIVILIZING MISSION:
CULTURAL IDEOLOGY INBRITISH INDIA 68,69 (Harald Fischer-Tine & Michael Mann eds., 2004)
(discussing British desire to secure the East India Company's economic success while remaining
uninvolved in religious and cultural practices of the local populations).
6. See AGNES, supranote 1, at 59 (describing the administrative shift in India from the
East India Company to the British Crown).
7. See Michael Mann, "TorchbearersUpon the Path ofProgress":Britain'sIdeology of
a "Moral and Material Progress" in India-An Introductory Essay, in COLONIALISM AS
CIVILIZING MISSION: CULTURAL IDEOLOGY INBRITISH INDIA, supranote 5, at 4 (noting Britain's
pursuit of a civilizing project in its colonies during the late eighteenth century).
8. See id. at 5 (discussing British conquest over Mughal rulers).
9. See Himani Bannerji, Age of Consent andHegemonic SocialReform, in GENDER AND
IMPERIALISM 21, 26 (Clare Midgley ed., 1998) (discussing colonial Britain's projection of an
"enlightened" self-identity); see also Mann, supra note 7, at 5 (describing British justification
for the civilizing mission).
10. See AGNES, supra note 1, at 65 (examining the contradictions between Hindu
revivalists and British administrators); Bannerji, supra note 9, at 23 (discussing the indigenous
male elite's role in Indian social reform and social control).
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which had already gathered together groups that, in pre-colonial times, might
not have accepted the authority of a monolithic Hindu or Muslim creed.1'
Negotiating those relationships and situations that would be governed by Hindu
or Islamic law or would be governed by the secular (though clearly Christian)
colonial law was a difficult task throughout the Victorian era. 12 In somewhat
simplified terms, both the British interpretation of India as a society driven by
religion and their own description of its glorious past compelled the colonial
authorities to accommodate traditional/religious laws of the religious
communities within their efforts to secularize and "enlighten" Indian society.
On the other hand, this glory of the ancient Indian past was utilized by the
Indian elite to discourage the logic of the civilizing mission. The civilizing
mission was deemed a way of emasculating Indian men
by asserting that they
13
were not capable of taking care of their own women.
This tussle over legal and political power between the native elites and the
colonialists was fought on the backs of Indian women because it was the
alleged degraded position of Indian women and the barbaric actions of Indian
men that justified the colonial mission in the first place.14 This brings into the
picture a third group, British feminists, who claimed a moral imperative to
reclaim for Indian women the dignity and rights of Western women.' 5
Ironically, of course, English women had very few legal rights during the
Victorian period, but that merely highlighted the problem of women in

11. See AGNES, supra note 1, at 59 (noting that British administrators were restrained
from interfering with the personal beliefs and practices of native Indians); see also NAMR, supra
note 1, at 40 (stating that the British attempted to "homogenize and codify theological aspects of
Indian law"). See generally CHARLES HEIMSATH, INDIAN NATIONALISM AND HINDU SOCIAL
REFORM (1964) (providing a traditional history of Hindu reform). It is important to note that
Hinduism was the predominant religion in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, though a
"Hindu is defined as a person domiciled in India who is not a Muslim, Christian, Jew, or
Zoroastrian." Malladi Subbama, The Status of Indian Women-Legal and CustomaryAspects,
in WOMEN IN INDIA: STUDIES IN THIRD WORLD SOCIETIES

93,93 (Vinson H. Sutlive & Tomoko

Hamada eds., 1996).
12. See Bannerji, supranote 9, at 23 (recognizing that British reform efforts "meandered
along a tortuous path .... ").
13. See NAIR, supranote 1, at 35 (explaining the British characterization of Indian men as
effeminate and incapable).
14. See AGNES, supra note 1, at 54 (describing the British goal to rescue Indian women
from barbaric family customs); Banneji, supra note 9, at 25 (noting that British reform was
initiated in the name of protecting Indian woman and describing Indian women's bodies as "the
discursive battleground between indigenous men and a patriarchal colonial state").
15. ANTOINETTE BURTON, BURDENS OF HISTORY: BRITISH FEMINISTS, INDIAN WOMEN, AND
IMPERIAL CULTURE, 1865-1915, at 17 (1994) (discussing British feminists' belief that Indian
women were their "special imperial burden").
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general. 16 British feminists claimed that they, rather than English and Indian
men, better understood the plight of Indian women.1 7 They claimed that by
acquiring legal and political rights at home-particularly the right to vote-they
would be able to better protect their native sisters. 8 The condition of the
Indian woman, particularly within the home, became the battleground on which
the contests of power between Indian and British men and between British men
and women were fought.' 9
We argue that one of the post-independence legacies of this complex
tussle for power is that even secular laws for women today are either
protectionist and patriarchal, or else modem Indian women are not in a position
to exercise their legal rights in meaningful ways. Victorian notions of
womanhood (chastity, innocence, self-effacement, and passiveness) continue to
pervade some laws, and certainly the traditional training of lawmakers and
judges in the British legal system allows them to bring their often patriarchal
understanding of the historical foundations of these laws to bear as precedents
and jurisprudential principles, even when the laws are facially egalitarian.
Because of space limitations, this Article will focus on three contested
reforms: (a) law reform in Britain and India around age of consent,
prostitution, and sexual agency; (b) law reform in both countries around widow
remarriage, widow reversion, and property rights; and (c) rights of abortion in
India in an era of female feticide. These examples allow us to explore the
linkages between colonial rulers, native elite, and British feminist interests and
see how they map onto the body of the Indian woman. In the end, we see that
gender reform in India was, and continues to be, motivated by a desire to
strengthen elite, patriarchal, and upper-caste political power.

16. See AGNES, supra note 1, at 53 (describing the "near subordination of women in
Britain").
17. See BURTON, supra note 15, at 12 (discussing the British feminists' belief that
"women, by virtue of their caretaking functions and their role as transmitters of culture, were
responsible for the uplift and improvement of the national body politic"); Jane Haggis, White
Women and Colonialism: Toward a Non-recuperativeHistory, in GENDER AND IMPERIALISM,
supra note 9, at 48 (noting the white woman's belief that she was better able to understand her
native sisters than men because of her shared experience of being a woman in a male world).
18. See BURTON, supranote 15, at 10-19 (discussing British feminists' use ofthe position
of Indian women to bolster the call for female emancipation).
19. See id. at 30 ("The Indian woman ... was the discourse terrain, the playing fields on
which Indian men and British feminist women each imagined their own liberation and political
self-representation in imperial Britain.").
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II. The Colonial Context and Competing Legal Authorities
Histories of pre-colonial India reveal an agrarian society in which very
strict, but often diverse, customs developed in the multiple tribes and castes.2 °
Smritis, or commentaries, that developed over the centuries to govern marriage
and family relationships were quite varied, some giving women rights to inherit
property, for instance, while others did not.' Some tribes, however, were not
governed by Smriti law, and women's property rights in those communities
were governed by customs, some of which were more liberal than Smritigoverned laws. 22 The Brahminical-Aryan customs that governed the upper
castes of northern India were decidedly anti-woman and patriarchal.2 3 Many of
the customs governing the lower castes and the Dravidian regions were more
liberal towards women mainly because women engaged actively in productive
labor.24 Divorce and remarriage, for instance, were prevalent among the
Lingayats, Kapus, Jats, and certain castes among the Maravars,Namosudras,
and Banias; remarriage was also permitted by all castes and tribes in the
northern parts of Bihar, Orissa, Chota Nagpur, and Assam except the
Brahmins, Kayasthas, Banias, and Rajputs.25 Many of these customs were
administered by family or caste councils or village panchayatsthat were not
affiliated with a centralized state.26

There was a great diversity of customs among every caste and subcaste,
and only the upper caste women in certain regions were rigidly governed by the
heavily patriarchal Sanskritic customs. 27 In the early decades of colonial rule, a
complex caste system, an agrarian society with a variety of land rights, a
pluralist religious system, and customary laws set India apart from other British
colonies. 28 "In North America and the Caribbean non-state legal systems were
quickly replaced by state systems which were primarily an extension of the
basic political and legal institutions of Britain. 2 9 But in India, it was difficult
20. See AGNES, supra note 1, at 12 (describing the diverse customs, laws, and nonstate
legal structures of ancient Indian communities).
21. Id.at 12-14.
22. Id.at 18.
23. Id.at 19-20.
24. Id.at 20.
25. Id.at21.
26. See id.at 22 (explaining that village panchayats administered local customs in precolonial India).
27. Id.at 19-20.
28. See NAIR, supra note 1, at 19 (discussing the distinctions between India and the
British colonies of North America and the Caribbean).
29. Id.at 19.
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to understand the pluralist culture enough to devise a governing structure that
would incur the least resistance from the native populations. 3 0 To control the
pluralism, the British redefined Indian society along religious and caste lines
that had little correspondence to the
authorities and norms of power previously
31
accepted by Indian communities.
This precedence to religious identity over other types of community
identity had a homogenizing effect for those groups that fell under Hinduism
without sharing the religious laws and customs of the Brahmins but who were
now subsumed under the Hindu label.32 Having defined India as a society
driven by religion and culture, it was thought that imperial reforms would occur
more smoothly if religious precepts were incorporated into major aspects of
colonial rule.33 Ironically, however, it was not entirely clear whether the local
customs and laws that the British authorities chose to recognize were actually
religious in origin or were merely customs that, over time, took on the type of
legitimacy that the British came to recognize as religious.34 In other words, the
customs and laws the British recognized were deemed to be religious in part
because they recognized and labeled them as such and not as secular.
The codification movement of the 1880s brought the castes and tribes that
were traditionally outside the Varna system into the Hindu fold, thereby
broadening the scope of the Hindu law, and eventually ousting and replacing
customary laws with a canonical Hindu law, at a time when there was no real
uniform understanding of the term "Hindu. 3 5 To keep from being drawn into
the Hindu net, Muslim political and religious leaders wanted to consolidate
their base by unifying the Muslim community, and one way of doing this was
by uniformly enforcing the Shariatlaw to bring about the "Islamization" of the
diverse Muslim communities.36 This process was simpler in the case of the
30. See supranote 12 and accompanying text (noting that the British found it difficult to
understand and reform Indian customs).
31. See NAR, supra note 1, at 22 ("[W]ith the support of British power, the Hindu law
expanded its authority across large areas of society which had not known it before, or which for
a very long period had possessed their own more localized and non-scriptural customs.").
32. See id. at 41 ("[H]omogenisation was in effect a Brahmanisation of Indian law at the
expense of customary law ....
").
33. See id. at 21 ("[R]eligion rather than economics or politics, was considered the prime
mover of Indian society throughout history."); id. at 40 (stating that the British attempted to
"homogenize and codify theological aspects of Indian law").
34. See AGNES, supra note 1, at 43 ("The customs and laws, which the English
administrators had decided to save, were in turn deemed to be religious.").
35. See id. at 24-25 (discussing the difficulties in defining the term "Hindu" and in
applying that term to diverse communities).
36. See NAIR, supra note 1,at 27 ("Muslim law was progressively Islamised.").
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Muslim community because of the existence of a written code and a text that
could be followed as the general law.37 For those people who fell outside either
the Hindu or Muslim construct, colonial authorities imposed predominantly
English laws, as in the case of the Married Women's Property Act of 1874,
which was applicable to members of the Christian, Parsi, and Jewish
communities in India.3 8
The unification and reform of law during this time was arguably a result of
the negotiations of the colonialists with the native elites. At a time when new
systems of economy and administration were being implemented, these elites
wanted to secure for themselves the newly available resources. At the same
time, in the context of confrontations between cultures, they wanted to make
sure they had a voice in defining what was "Hindu" or "Muslim" or "Indian."
This made them co-conspirators in matters of social reform related to women at
the same time as they were resisting imperialist efforts to redefine Indian
society. Conservative Muslim and Hindu leaders benefited from the British
willingness to cede authority in private and family relationships, and power
struggles to define the contours of Hindu or Muslim law often resulted in
weakening customary rights and pluralist tendencies. 39 The British insisted on
greater regularization of procedure and on the creation of state courts that
would turn to scriptural sources rather than the varied and often ill-defined
customs of different groups.4 ° Many customs simply were eliminated within
the emerging Anglo-Hindu law because British standards of proof as to their
scope and content could not be satisfied. 41 The growing bureaucratization and
centralization privileged those native leaders who could claim a position at the
center, though not necessarily as allies of the British.
After the Mutiny of 1857, the East India Company's power over India was
replaced by the British Crown, which was made the political sovereign by the
37. See id. at 27 (pointing out that the scriptural roots of Muslim law were relatively easy
to trace).
38. See AGNES, supra note 1, at 130 (discussing the application of English law to
communities that were not Hindu or Muslim); NAIR, supra note 1, at 187 (noting that the Hindu
Women's Property Act of 1874 did not apply to Muslims, Buddhists, or Sikhs).
39. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (explaining how British interference with
Indian law affected traditional customs despite a professed policy of noninterference with
religious and personal Indian laws).
40. See AGNES, supra note 1, at 43 (discussing the Anglicization of Hindu and Muslim
scriptures).
41. See id. at 52 ("Unless it could be proved that the custom was ancient, certain,
obligatory, reasonable and not against public policy, it had a very slim chance of survival."); cf
Kolsky, supranote 2, at 641-42 (discussing the codification movement's attempt to unify under
English law the pluralistic communal law of indigenous India).
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Queen's Proclamation of 1858.42 With sovereignty settled in the British
Crown, once again, authority over private family relationships was ceded to
local religious authority. 43 Most important, all issues concerning personal
matters were deemed to be religious rather than customary, sanctioning the use
of scriptural and textual authorities rather than situational or practical
authorities. 44 After 1858, the Indian Parliament also passed legislation
concerning personal and family matters for those persons not within the
monolithic Hindu or Muslim communities-namely Christian immigrants and
converts, Jews, and Parsis-which were remarkably similar to those enacted in
England. 45 Thus, when divorce was introduced in the 1869 Indian Divorce
Act, the grounds were fault-based and premised on an adversarial structure of
blame and innocence, which contradicted many of the local customs of marital
dissolution by community-based arbitrations.46 As English family law was
imported through legislation as well as through judicial procedures and
professional training of lawyers and judges in England, disparities between
Hindu and English family law were highlighted.4 7 The second half of the
nineteenth century, therefore, became a battleground to remold Indian family
law within a Western model.4 8
In a new adversarial world, battles between colonial British interests and
native elites focused heavily on the status of Indian women and matrimonial
rights and obligations. 49 The supposed "barbaric" state of Indian family law,
however, was, in large part, a product of the colonial attempts to codify and
canonize private family relations and customs.50 Many supposed "settled
infallible principles of Hindu and Muslim family law" 51 were actually recent
constructs that arose out of English translations of certain religious texts made
42. See AGNES, supra note 1, at 59 ("Queen Victoria... restrained [British]
administrators from interference in the realm of personal beliefs and practices of the
natives .....
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.at61.
46. Id.at 62.
47. See id. at 64 (describing the differences between British laws and Hindu and Muslim
customs).
48. See id. at 65 ("Hindu conjugality became the main battleground for the revivalist
struggle for national identity and any reform within personal laws came to be viewed by this
faction with extreme hostility.").
49. See id. at 64 (discussing the conflict between British interests and native elites).
50. See id.
(noting that English translations of original Hindu and Muslim texts created
legal principles of perceived anti-women biases).
51. Id.
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and religious authorities in
more patriarchal through concessions to native elites
2
centuries.
nineteenth
early
and
the eighteenth
The British wanted to bring Western enlightenment to the native Indian
family by abolishing child marriages, sati, the prohibition of the remarriage of
widows, purdah,and similar patriarchal customs that oppressed women. 53 And
while widows did not throw themselves on their husbands' funeral pyres in
Sussex, many of the so-called barbarities of Indian family life were exaggerated
constructs that never represented true Indian family relations. It seems the
British, in truly British fashion, had set themselves the noble task of reforming
the barbaric Indian male, a fictional character that they had, in large part,
created.
III. The British FeministReform Movement and the Civilizing Mission
British imperialists were not an entirely male species. The imagery of the
civilizing mission, especially as it pertained to relieving Indian women of the
horrors of their subjugated state, was profoundly attractive to British women
who felt that they had some greater authority to speak on behalf of their Indian
sisters than British men. 54 But even these altruistic female reformers could not
escape their imperialist roots.55 Antoinette Burton writes on how middle-class
British feminists invoked images of Indian women as victims awaiting redress
at the hands of imperial saviors in order to further their own claims for suffrage
and political rights: "'The Indian Woman,' represented almost invariably as a
helpless, degraded victim of religious custom and uncivilized cultural practices,
signified a burden for whose sake many white women left Britain and devoted
their lives in the empire. 5 6 British feminists identified themselves with the
52.

at 64-65.
See id.

The concern of reformers for changing the status of women became trapped within
the binaries of a superior Hindu culture projected by the revivalists and the
civilizing project of the British administrators. But the rigid Victorian morality was
the parameter set by all factions for determining the status of women.
Id.
53. See id.at 205 (explaining that it was commonly believed that colonial intervention
was driven by a desire to liberate Indian women from "the barbaric customs of sati, female
infanticide and marital rape of infant brides").
54. See BURTON, supra note 15, at 3 (noting the British feminists' view that they were
saviors of the entire world and trumpeters of a "global sisterhood"); see alsosupra note 17 and
accompanying text (explaining how British feminists believed they related to Indian women).
55. See BURTON, supranote 15, at 3 ("[N]otions of universal sisterhood are predicated on
the erasure of the history and the effects of contemporary imperialism.").
56. Id. at 8.
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cause of Indian women and the civilizing mission of the empire, deploying
nationalist and imperialist rhetoric to bolster their activist roles within
England. The essence of the white feminist burden was that votes for women
women to "relieve Indian women's suffering and 'uplift'
would enable British
58
their condition."
As British women were advocating in England for civil divorce, married
women's property rights, the abolition of the Contagious Diseases Acts,
suffrage, and a host of other women's reforms, they would routinely praise the
enlightened state of Western law as it related to women because of its stark
contrast to the family laws that prevailed in India. 59 These activists certainly
could not unpack the socially-constructed nature of the images of the degraded
Indian woman and, in many respects, helped to construct those images.60
There was an indelible link in the minds of British feminists that if they
lost a battle on the Indian front, they would be likely to lose it at home as well.
They cautioned against the moral as well as legal contagion coming from the
colonies and argued that they were best situated to guard the home front.6 1
There was a complex relationship between the British feminists' beliefs about
their Christian duty to rescue their downtrodden Indian sisters and their selfinterested motives in depicting Indian women as downtrodden to legitimize
their own authority to speak at home. This conflict is, of course, also played
out in the context of contested notions of Victorian femininity. British
feminists were accused of being masculine, shrill viragos who had overstepped
their proper natural spheres when they advocated for legal and political
reform.62 But British women used the legitimizing power of the civilizing
mission to justify their transgression of these norms. They fought to give
Indian women the right to be the proper, passive, and idealized Victorian
women that they themselves rejected. The instrumental way in which British
women tried to bring to Indian women the protections of Victorian notions of
womanhood (as opposed to the sexually degraded image Indian women were
57. See id. at 10 (recognizing that British women wanted to "uplift" Indian women and
carry "the white woman's burden").
58. Id.
59. See id (noting that British women used the image of Indian women to unite in a
number of causes, including "suffrage, repeal, social purity, or a combination thereof').
60. See id. at 30 ("The Indian woman and the variety of images attendant upon this
characterization was thus largely the invention of middle-class British feminists in an imperial
culture.").
61. See id. (explaining how the British feminists' pledge to save Indian women was
extrapolated into the argument that British feminism was going to save the faltering British
empire itself).
62. See id. at 18 ("[A]II feminist women were targeted as unwomanly...
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imagined to portray) undermined their own efforts to reject those constraints as
they applied to themselves.
As British feminists acted in paternalistic and protectionist ways, they
sought to impose on Indian women precisely the constraints of Victorian
femininity that they were fighting at home. Women should not be sex slaves
locked up in harems, nor should they be child-brides at ten and widows at
fourteen expected to throw themselves on their husbands' funeral pyre. They
should instead be respectable middle-class English wives, dedicated to their
families, running their homes, and guarding their chastity at all costs.
Any effort to understand legal reform in India must take into account the
complex relationships between male colonial authorities and native elites,
between male colonial authorities and imperial minded British feminists, and
between native elites and British feminists. The political stakes in home-front
legislative reform were indelibly tied to reform in India, which was being
played out in a kind of complicated four-dimensional chess game. If British
women were interfering in Indian law reform because they feared its effects at
home, and their rhetoric was recasting the debates to suit their own political
agenda, then colonial authorities had to negotiate with that constituency while
they also negotiated the power and authority of native elites to define Indian
culture. There was a delicate balance between the interests of these three
groups that we see played out in a variety of law reforms.
IV. Reforms in Age of Consent Law
One of the legal reforms in India that most clearly followed upon the
efforts of British reformers was "age of consent" law-law governing the age at
which adolescents can legally consent to sexual intercourse.63 Nineteenth
century age of consent laws in England and India arose in the context of
prostitution and child marriage, respectively, which were social issues directly
linked to Victorian notions of domesticity and sexual restraint. The different
cultural contexts, however, show how a concept as simple as age of consent
takes on multiple meanings when different groups are vying for control over
sexuality and for the power to define the appropriate contours of the family. In
England, prostitution threatened the sanctity of the middle-class home and the
Victorian wife's hold on reproduction. In India, the child-bride, an upper-caste
phenomenon, brought colonial norms of sexual restraint and family structure
into conflict with native claims over the right to define the private realm of the
63. See HEIMSATH, supranote 11, at 161 (describing the British effort to reform Indian
age of consent laws).
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family. In the end, however, British women cared most about age of consent,
because both prostitution and the child-bride threatened their power to define
the parameters of sexual access.
In the summer of 1885, William T. Stead of the Pall Mall Gazette
published an expos6 on the foreign trafficking of women and the entrapment of
children into prostitution-one of the most successful pieces of scandal
journalism published in nineteenth century Britain. 64 In The Maiden Tribute of
Modern Babylon, Snead recounted the purchase, for five pounds, of young
rural virgins for sale to satisfy the lusts of the decadent aristocratic class. 65
Judith Walkowitz explains:
The series had an electrifying effect on public opinion: []By the third
installment mobs were rioting at the Pall Mall Gazette offices ....An

enormous public demonstration was held in Hyde Park (estimated at
250,000) to demand the passage of legislation raising the age of consent for
girls from thirteen to sixteen. Reformers of all shades were represented on
the dozen or so demonstration platforms. For one brief moment, feminists
and personal-rights advocates joined with Anglican bishops and socialists
to protest the aristocratic corruption of young innocents.
The Maiden Tribute was inspired by Josephine Butler, who had been fighting
67
the Contagious Diseases Acts, and Catherine Booth of the Salvation Army.
Together they had been unsuccessful in getting Parliament to deal
constructively with prostitution.68 In their reform pamphlets and rhetoric, they
focused heavily on the sexual victimization of women, and they were
uncomfortable with assertions of female sexual agency. 69 As Walkowitz
explains, "[s]hifting the cultural image of the prostitute to the innocent70child
victim encouraged new, more repressive, political initiatives over sex."
Victorian reformers were consistently conflicted in their attitudes toward
female sexuality, and The Maiden Tribute provided a broad cultural discourse
in which to critique male sexual license, upper class privileges, and the failings
64. See Judith R. Walkowitz, Male Vice andFemale Virtue: Feminism andthe Politicsof
Prostitutionin Nineteenth-CenturyBritain,in POWERS OF DESIRE: THE POLITICS OF SEXUALrrY
419,425 (Ann Snitow, Christine Stansell & Sharon Thompson eds., 1983) (describing W.T.
Stead's The Maiden Tribute of Modern Babylon and stating that The Maiden Tribute "was one
of the most successful pieces of scandal journalism published in Britain in the nineteenth
century").
65. Id.
66. Id
67. Id.

68.

Id.

69.
70.

Id. at 427.
Id. at 426.
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of an unresponsive Parliament without really addressing women's sexual
agency. 7' The expos6 mobilized the population behind the issues of "white
slavery" and aristocratic license in a way that reformers, lawmakers, and
journalists could not have imagined before that summer.72 Notably, the core of
their concern was the male predator, generally the aristocraticS73
male, whose
open access to working-class girls was a time-honored prerogative. For many,
prostitution was seen as a social disease caused by economic woes among the
rural peasantry who became vulnerable to the licentious decadence of the ruling
elite.74 The solution was to raise the age of consent for sexual intercourse from
thirteen to sixteen, to reduce the victimization of girls who were believed to
have little or no control over their sexual conduct. 75
There can be no doubt that the uproar over The Maiden Tribute played a
role in the reform movement in India to change the age of consent there as well.
In 1891, an Age of Consent Bill was introduced to raise the age of consent from
ten to twelve.76 The bill was spurred by the publication of a rather heinous case
involving the death of a child-bride often or eleven who was killed by a brutal
71. The uproar over The Maiden Tribute also
forced the passage of the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1885, a particularly
nasty and pernicious piece of omnibus legislation. The 1885 act raised the age of
consent for girls from thirteen to sixteen, but it also gave police far greater
summary jurisdiction over poor working-class women and children-a trend that
Butler and her circle had always opposed. Finally, it contained a clause making
indecent acts between consenting male adults a crime, thus forming the basis of
legal prosecution of male homosexuals in Britain until 1967.
Id. at 427. See generally Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885, 48 & 49 Vict., c. 69 (Eng.).
72. For a discussion of Josephine Butler's efforts to get lawmakers to take seriously the
issues of prostitution and the sexual double standard and of the effects of The Maiden Tribute's
publication, see Walkowitz, supra note 64, at 425.
73. See id. at 426.
The disreputable performance of MPs during the debates over the age of consent
confirmed feminists' worst suspicions about "the vicious upper classes." During
the debates, old rakes like Cavendish Bentinck treated prostitution as a necessary
and inevitable evil, while others openly defended sexual access to working-class
girls as a time-honored prerogative of gentlemen.
Id.
74. The Maiden Tribute's focus on the plight of poor rural girls lured into the sex trade
corresponded with Josephine Butler's argument that prostitution was not a choice, but rather a
necessity. See generally JOSEPHINE BUTLER AND THE PROSTITUTION CAMPAIGNS: DISEASES OF

THE BODY POLITIC (Emily Sharp & Jane Jordan eds., 2004).
75. See generally Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885, 48 & 49 Vict., c. 69 (Eng.).
76. See MEREDITH BORTHWICK, THE CHANGING ROLE OF WOMEN INBENGAL: 1849-1905,
at 126-27 (1984) ("More direct measures were seen to be necessary, and were taken in the Age
of Consent Bill of 1891 .... The 1890 bill proposed to raise the age of consent from ten to
twelve.").
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sexual encounter with her thirty-five year old husband, another image of male
sexual license run amok. 7 The Age of Consent Bill, however, created strong
opposition from the native population because it ultimately interfered with the
rights of the native male over his wife.78
Because the politics of colonial masculinity had constructed an
autonomous sphere for indigenous masculinity-the private sphere of the home
and family--colonial rulers were caught between the demands of native males
to keep out of the Indian home and the demands of British feminists to save
Indian women. To counter the claim that they were interfering in the private
realm of the Indian family, the colonial and reform authorities maintained that
the Age of Consent Bill was not about age of marriage, but rather about an age
at which sexual intercourse is appropriate. 79 Supposedly, the colonial state was
not interfering in the autonomous Indian family but was, instead, protecting
young girls from sexual acts that could be physically harmful. 80 But as the
indigenous populations quickly pointed out, sexual intercourse within marriage
is not rape. If the age of consent was raised without changing the age of
marriage, the state was introducing the possibility of marital rape within Indian
families at a time when England itself did not recognize the crime. 8'
It was not an accident that the debate over age of consent in India formed
around the issue of marriage, while in England it formed around prostitution.
And clearly, the concern was not for the welfare of the child-bride in India as
legislation against child marriage was not passed until 1929, nearly forty years
later.82 The issue that gripped the English imagination was aristocratic male
77. Id. at 128.
78. The issue of age of consent and conjugal rights of a man over his wife were especially
pronounced in the Rakhmabai (also called Rukhmabai)case, which captured the attention of the
English. See, e.g., Meera Kosambi, Gender Reform and Competing State Controls over
Women: The Rakhmabai Case (1884-1888), in SOCIAL REFORM, SEXUALITY AND THE STATE
265, 265-289 (Patricia Uberoi ed., 1996) (discussing the Rakhmabai case in conjunction with
gender reform in India); Nalini Rajan, PersonalLaws and Public Memory, 40 EcON. & POL.
WKLY. 2653, 2654-55 (2005) (discussing the struggle between British colonial rule and Hindu
orthodoxy).
79. See generally Bannerj i, supra note 9 (discussing how age of consent laws interfered in
the family realm).
80. See id. at 25 ("The reforming impulse of the British colonial state in India had little to
do with the protection of women and girls, though initiated in their names.").
81. See BORTHWICK, supra note 76, at 128-29 ("Hindu writers ... represented the bill as
an attempt to introduce 'unholiness' into this sacred bond by allowing the possibility of rape in
marriage. It was pointed out that rape within marriage was not recognized under English law.").
82. See Sumita Mukerjee, Using Legislative Assemblyfor Social Reform: The SardaAct
of 1929, 26 S. AsIA REs. 219, 219 (2006) ("In 1929, the Legislative Assembly of India...
passed [the Child Marriage Restraint Act of 1929] making the minimum age of marriage 14
years for girls.").
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license, while the underlying issue in India was colonial interference in the
sexual relations of a husband and his child-bride.
Age of consent arose in the context of prostitution in England because
prostitution threatened efforts to curb sexual excess-a task taken on by
Victorian wives, clergy, and middle-class men who equated sexual restraint
with moral and civil superiority. These groups generally linked social stability
with domestic stability, which they defined as compliance with norms of sexual
restraint. Men and women were expected to postpone sexual intimacy until
marriage and then to limit it to procreative purposes, overcoming their desires
by channeling their energies into other arenas such as: work, church, or
charitable endeavors. Child marriage was not considered a problem because
the vast majority of couples married in their twenties, and it was the Fleet
marriage or elopement that captured the British imagination.83 Arranged
marriages, while not unheard of, were certainly criticized in the literature of the
day.84 It was the prostitute, however, that most threatened the English wife's
control over her husband's sexuality.
Most English women accepted the sexual double standard and separate
spheres, so marriage for them was not problematic.85 But everything about
Indian child marriage was wrong to Victorian women and men. The brides
were too young; the marriages were arranged without regard to the wishes of
the woman; and her vulnerability made it unlikely that she would be able to
stand up to her older husband if he should demand forced or unnatural sex acts.
While Victorians had their own issues with sexuality, pedophilia and rape
crossed a line that most felt comfortable drawing, and the Indian child marriage
looked an awful lot like both. In many ways, therefore, British men and women
simply wanted to protect these young girls from the same kind of sexual license
they feared in The Maiden Tribute. But that was much more difficult when it
came in the form of legitimate marriage and accepted socio-religious customs.
83. See JOHN GILLIS, FOR BETTER, FOR WORSE: BRITISH MARRIAGES, 1600 TO THE PRESENT
111 (1985) (showing that the mean ages of marriage for men and women from 1550 to 1900
ranged between twenty-three and twenty-eight); DAVID LEVINE, FAMILY FORMATION INAN AGE
OF NASCENT CAPITALISM 48 (1977) (finding that in the towns of Shepshed and Bottesford
approximately 70% of women were married by the age of twenty-nine); see also GILLIS, supra,
at 90-98 (discussing Fleet marriages, clandestine marriages, and elopements that led to the
passage of Lord Hardwick's Marriage Act in 1753).
84.

See LAWRENCE STONE, THE FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND: 1500-1800, at

272, 282-87 (1977) (discussing the trend in all but the highest classes for children to have some
say in their marriage partners by the late seventeenth century and the rise in the romantic novel);
id. at 274-81 (providing a sampling of literature from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries).
85. See Danaya C. Wright, "Well-Behaved Women Don't Make History": Rethinking
English Family, Law, and History, 19 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 211,234-39 (2004) (discussing the
acceptance of the sexual double standard and separate spheres).
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By raising the age of consent by a mere two years, from ten to twelve, the
colonial authorities appeared to be taking action when, in reality, they did very
little to protect young girls. But as with age of consent reforms in England, the
law ultimately forced a wedge into the absolute dominion of men over women
by asserting that women should not be forced into marriage or sexual relations
and should have some say in their domestic lives.
From the perspective of the colonial rulers, interference in Indian family
and religious principles was to be avoided so long as those principles did not
enrage the British public, as sati, child-brides, and polygamy did. They also
did not want widows or single women falling on the welfare of the parish or the
state because women generally were to be under the dominion of a man. So, as
far as the colonial rulers were concerned, they had little to gain and much to
lose by interfering too much in the Indian family and marriage. Similarly,
native elites had much to gain by retaining control over the Indian family and
marriage, particularly by retaining control over women's sexuality and
property. Between these two groups of men, therefore, there was little
incentive to upset the cultural norms, and it is not surprising, therefore, that it
took another forty years before child marriages were outlawed.
British feminists, on the other hand, were deeply concerned about the
infection of the British family from diseased prostitutes and sexual promiscuity,
controlled in part by the Contagious Diseases Acts and age of consent laws. In
order to maintain their own domestic control and status as moral superiors, they
needed to enforce Victorian norms of the nuclear family and sexual restraint.
They focused on the prostitute at home because it was the prostitute who
infected their husbands, who then brought the disease into the sanctity of their
English homes. The threat of venereal disease was a constant image in the
feminist press of the Victorian period.86 In India, however, the threat of sexual
perversity pervaded marriage itself and gave rise to fears that male expectations
about pedophilia and rape would make their way northward to threaten British
marriages. The feminists focused in Britain on prostitution and in India on
marriages because both threatened the Victorian marriage at home. While
neither English men nor Indian men felt a great incentive to interfere with the
regulation and examination of prostitutes under the Contagious Diseases Acts,
the age of consent for sexual intercourse, or the age of marriage, these laws all
threatened to weaken British women's control over the family sphere and the
moral boundaries of sexual behavior by infiltrating the sanctity of the British
home.
86.

See generally E.M. Sigsworth & T.J. Wyke, A Study of Victorian Prostitutionand
(Martha Vicinus
ed., 1972).
Venereal Disease, in SUFFER AND BE STILL: WOMEN IN THE VICTORIAN AGE 77
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V. Widow Remarriage,Reversions, andDower Reforms
Not surprisingly, marriage has different legal meanings in England and
India. In England, once married, a husband and wife would generally take up
residence together in their own home and set about their collective life together.
Anglo-American law views the married couple as its own independent legal
unit, and neither a parent nor a child of the couple has any right to control the
assets of the couple. This notion of marriage, that the couple becomes a single
legal unit independent of their families, is the basis for the common law
doctrine of coverture.87
In India, on the other hand, the bride leaves her home and "joins" her
husband's family, often moving into a family house that includes her husband's
parents, perhaps his brothers and their wives and children, and maybe even a
grandparent or collateral relative.8 8 Fathers would provide significant dowries
on behalf of their daughters as theyjoined these new families, and this property
would be assimilated into the overall assets of the husband's family. Feudal
practices long discontinued in Britain, such as the paying of bride-price or
marritagium,would accompany the transfer of the bride's domicile from the
home of her father to that of her husband and his family. An Indian bride,
therefore, had virtually no control over the property paid by her family when
she married. That property would be controlled by her husband's father, her
husband and his brothers, or perhaps even her husband's mother.
These differences in household structure and expectations meant that the
power of the widow to control marital assets would be starkly different in the
two countries. In England, the widow historically was entitled to a life estate in
one-third of all land owned by the couple during the marriage and to the use of
all personal property as her dower. 89 Because the couple would have taken up
residence apart from the husband's parents, the widow's ability to resist
pressure from her husband's parents would be greatly enhanced.
87. Under coverture, all property brought to the marriage would be owned by the marital
unit, though all management and dispository powers would be held by the husband. See
Wright, supranote 85, at 231-34 ("Under coverture, wives' legal identities were merged in that
of their husbands. They could not own their own property.... ."). During the marriage, the
husband has ultimate ownership and control of the marital property, and the wife has the legal
right to be maintained, as well as a legal or equitable lien on all marital property in the event her
husband predeceases her. Id.
88. See BORTHWICK, supranote 76, at 109-14 (discussing girls' fears of leaving home to
join their husbands' families); see also VANAJA DHROVARAGAN, HINDu WOMEN AND THE POWER
OF IDEOLOGY 35-40 (1989) (discussing the Indian joint family).
89.

See EILEEN SPRING, LAW, LAND AND FAMILY:

ARISTOCRATIC INHERITANCE IN

ENGLAND, 1300-1800, at 40 (1993) (discussing the dower rights of the widow).
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In India, however, the widow would continue to reside in the home of her
husband's family, especially if they had children. 90 Her day-to-day life would
be unchanged, in large part, because her support would come from the larger
familial unit. For wealthy families, the widow's claim on the estate might be
large while the actual expenses necessary for covering her support would be
comparatively low, creating an obvious incentive to keep the widow joined to
her husband's family in order to retain control over the deceased husband's
estate. Add to this the unusual situation of the child-widow, an anomaly of the
wealthy classes. She was often without children and therefore posed a
significant threat to family unity. A cloistered life was the best that many of
these child-widows could expect, which served the dual purpose of holding the
widow's share of the estate within the household and controlling her sexuality.
In the lower classes, on the other hand, where the husband's estate was
relatively small or nonexistent and the widow's support comparatively
substantial, the customary rules usually encouraged the widow to remarry. 91
The differences between the Indian joint family and the English
independent marital unit made it almost self-evident that the same laws on the
widow's property rights would play out very differently in the two countries.
The sad irony, however, is that the colonial authorities, under pressure from
native elites, simply imported English laws on widow's property into late
nineteenth century India to deal with the relatively anomalous condition of the
child-widow.
In England, the widow originally was entitled to a life estate in one-third
92
of the real property owned by her husband at any time during their marriage.
Because this had the obvious effect of hampering marketability of land (by
requiring the wife's noncoerced signature to relinquish her dower rights),
lawyers, fathers, and husbands devised numerous techniques to defeat the
widow's share.93 Over time, dower would be replaced with an annuity for
support during widowhood, which was eroded to roughly ten percent per year
of the property the wife herself brought to the marriage.94 Thus, it would take
90. See DHROVARAGAN, supranote 88, at 91-92 (discussing the loss in status of widows);
see generally Lucy Carroll, Law, Custom, and Statutory Social Reform: The Hindu Widows'
RemarriageAct of 1856, in WOMEN IN COLONIAL INDIA: ESSAYS ON SURVIVAL, WORK AND THE

STATE 3 (J. Krishnamurty ed., 1989).
91. See Carroll, supra note 90, at 2 ("[T]he lower, particularly Sudra, castes ... neither
practiced child marriage nor prohibited the remarriage of widows.").
92. See SPRING, supra note 89, at 40-41 (discussing the evolution of the dower right into
a firm one-third life estate).
93. See id.
at 44 (stating that women sued successfully for their dower in English courts).
94. See id. at 50-51 ("The final ratio [jointure to portion] of [ten] percent is common ....
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over ten years of widowhood before a woman would begin to consume any of
the property in her husband's estate. 95
Once the widow's claim upon her husband's estate was dramatically
reduced, it became customary to view the husband's obligation to his widow as
merely a duty to support her in her widowhood. This shift corresponded with
the changing nature of the English family, from a partnership model typical of
the artisan classes in which the wife and husband jointly contributed to the
family's support, to a dependency model typical of the rising middle classes in
which the wife remained at home, focused on child-rearing and domestic
maintenance. 96 Notably, in England, the tendency was to encourage the
remarriage of the widow because she would generally cease to have any support
claims on the property of the first husband, which had descended to their eldest
son, the daughters collectively, or in the absence of children, to collateral male
relatives on both sides. But despite the technicalities of wills and estates laws,
the English widow would usually reside in her own home, have control over at
least an annuity if not real property, and remain free to remarry based on
affection and desire rather than desperation.9 7 For the English widow,
The [ten] percent ratio thus clearly established before the end of the seventeenth century was to
remain the norm all through the eighteenth century.").
95. See id.
at 51-52.
A widow would have to outlive her husband for ten years before she would
consume her portion. Only after that would she become a charge upon her
husband's land, and even then, in what must in normal circumstances be her last
few years, she would be a charge far short of dower, for speaking to averages, [ten]
percent upon her relatively small portion would be far short of one-third of his
income.
Id.
96. See Wright, supra note 85, at 235 (discussing a change in the conception of the
English family).
97. The first decade of civil divorce petitions, filed between 1858 and 1866, showed a
somewhat surprising trend with regard to the likelihood of divorced wives to remarry. After
civil divorce was made available in 1858, wives had the choice of seeking ajudicial separation
on the grounds of adultery, desertion, or cruelty (none of which allowed for remarriage), or a
full divorce with the right to remarry on the grounds of aggravated adultery (adultery plus
desertion, cruelty, or bigamy). Wright, supra note 85, at 247. It is notable that half of the
young wives (women married five years or less) and half of the oldest wives (women married
twenty-five years or more) attempting to end their marriages chose ajudicial separation over a
full divorce. Id. at 280-82. In contrast, women in between (married ten to twenty-five years)
were four times more likely to seek a full divorce rather than a judicial separation. Id These
statistics may be skewed, however, because many wives might not have had sufficient proof of
aggravated adultery to obtain a full divorce and were, therefore, forced to accept a judicial
separation instead. This preference for separation over divorce leads to the conclusion that
women did not view remarriage as a goal in these proceedings. If they did, they would seek a
full divorce (assuming, of course, a woman who chose divorce over separation did so at least in
part because it left her the ability to remarry). Admittedly this evidence is not direct evidence of
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therefore, the decision to remarry was generally her own, to be made in
consideration of the fact that she would often trade her annuity from her
deceased husband's estate for the right to support from her new husband.
Because she was often comfortable, she was not desperate to remarry, but there
were financial implications of her decision.
Because wives in India joined the families of their husbands, the
incentives and barriers to remarriage were quite different. As noted above, the
young widow, who was often childless, faced a lifetime cloistered in her
husband's family, vulnerable to abuse and resentment from those who did not
98
want her but wanted to retain control over the property she brought with her.
Two aspects of this situation reveal stark differences between the English and
the Indian widow. The first is control over property.
Because the Indian bride joined the family of her husband, her family had
to provide dowry to assist them in providing her lifetime support. According to
both the Dayabhagaand the Mitaksharasystems of Hindu law, a widow could
inherit the entirety of her husband's estate in the absence of a son, a son's son,
99
or a son's son's son, although she only held this property during her lifetime.
attitudes toward remarriage, but late-Victorian census data confirms that the idea of remarriage
was apparently not attractive enough to result in the majority of women moving to successive
husbands. See W.A. Armstrong, A Note on the HouseholdStructure in Mid-Nineteenth-Century
York in ComparativePerspective, in HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY IN PAST TIME 205, 208 (Peter
Laslett ed., 1972) (finding that nearly 14% of households were headed by widows and an
additional 5% were headed by single females, totaling nearly 20%, whereas the combination of
households headed by widowers and households headed by single men totaled only 8%). Also,
Peter Laslett's data ofpreindustrial England shows widows and single females heading 14% of
households and widowers and single men heading only 7% of households. Peter Laslett, Mean
Household Size in EnglandSince the Sixteenth Century, in HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY INPAST
TIME, supra, at 145. While this data does not identify the number of households in which the
widow remarried, there were nearly three times as many widows as widowers. Id. Also, as
many as 40% of children could expect to be orphaned (loss of at least one parent) before they
reached the age of majority. Danaya C. Wright, DeManneville v. DeManneville: Rethinking
the Birth of Custody Law Under Patriarchy,17 L. & HIST. REv. 247, 269 n.71 (1999).
98. See Carroll, supranote 90, at 2.
Irrevocably, eternally married as a mere child, the death of the husband she had
perhaps never known left the wife a widow, an inauspicious being whose sins in a
previous life had deprived her of her husband .... Doomed to a life of prayer,
fasting, and drudgery, unwelcome at the celebrations and auspicious occasions that
are so much a part of Hindu family and community life, her lot was scarcely to be
envied.
Id.
99. Id. at 3; see also Karen I. Leonard & John G. Leonard, Social Reform and Women's
Participationin PoliticalCulture: Andhra and Madras, in THE EXTENDED FAMILY: WOMEN
AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN 19, 23-24 (Gail Minault ed., 1989)
(discussing the age of marriage-96% by age twenty-and the rate of widowhood).
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On her death, in the event of her having no son, property would revert back to the
husband's kin.100 If she were to marry again and take with her the property of her
deceased husband, it would mean a loss for the husband's family, or, even worse,
if she inherited her husband's coparcenary rights in an undivided property, she
might demand a partition.
The second concern was unlicensed sexuality. Young widows in particular
were likely to be sexually active, though not always willingly so. The
corresponding problems of illegitimate children and infanticide were exacerbated
when vulnerable widows were kept within their husbands' families to maintain
control over property, but their reproductive abilities could not be controlled and
thus threatened caste and lineal purity. In 1837, the Law Commission considered
the issue of widow remarriage seriously and concluded:
[I]nfanticide could be curbed only if widow remarriage was legalized. But
after deliberations and considering the then demands for a stable and
unopposed rule, the government concluded that, even though such a law was
socially highly desirable, passing it would involve going against Hindu
strictures and laws of inheritance (Dayabhaag)and [was] hence infeasible.' 0'
An important factor in the issue of widow remarriage was the supposed
belief that Hinduism required an ascetic widowhood.102 As the colonial
authorities insisted on their policy of noninterference in the personal laws of the
Hindus, we see that the replacement of customary laws with the "values of
orthodox Hinduism, " 103 and the "'Hinduising' of castes and tribes on the fringes
of Hinduism"' 4 led to the recasting of pragmatic concerns over control of
property in religious terms. No longer was the issue one of mundane and
materialistic concerns about wealth; rather, the widow's life was to be focused on
the spiritual realm where she could worship her dead husband's memory and
devote her life to an ascetic existence that conveniently rejected material
comforts. The ultimate rejection of her husband's wealth and manifestation of
her spiritual existence came when she agreed to be a sati.

100. See Carroll, supra note 90, at 2-3 (explaining what happened to a widow's property at
her death).
101. Indranell Dasgupta & Diganta Mukherjee, She Could or She Didn't? A Revisionist
Analysis of the Failureof the Widow RemarriageAct of 1856, at 1 (2006) (Ctr. for Research in
Econ. Dev. and Int'l Trade, Univ. of Nottingham, CREDIT Research Paper No. 06/01),
availableat http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/economics/credit/research (last visited Feb. 20, 2008)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
102. See Carroll, supra note 90, at 2 (remarking on young widowhood).
103. Id.
104. Id.

THE LEGACY OF COLONIALISM

1337

The solution to the problem of ascetic widowhood was a compromise that
reconciled the reformist concern of widow remarriage and the patriarchal
concerns of the loss of familial property.10 5 This reconciliation, embedded in
the Hindu Widows' Remarriage Act of 1856 was the forfeiture clause (clause 2
of the Act). This clause called for the widow's property, on her remarriage, to
be forfeited in favor of the deceased husband's next of kin, just as the law
provided in England.' 0 6 Ironically, the solution to the problem of sati, the
child-widow, illegitimacy, and infanticide was to impose the English law of
aristocratic inheritance onto all Indian families, even though most aristocratic
English families for centuries had been renegotiating the effects ofthe common
law of inheritance through strict settlements, trusts, and other devices.
The forfeiture provisions of the 1856 Hindu Widows' Remarriage Act of
1856 clearly envisioned a world in which widows deserved support but were
not entitled to control marital property. By creating a new law to deal with a
problem experienced by a relatively small percentage of upper-caste Hindus,
the colonial authorities inadvertently eroded the customary laws of those groups
that had generally allowed remarriage. The faint acquaintance of colonial
adjudicators with Indian laws and customs, and the ambiguity caused thereby,
is clear from the way in which different high courts interpreted the Act. The
Allahabad High Court held that the Act did not apply to those communities
which, by their customary law, had allowed widow remarriage.' 07 This meant
that not only could a widow remarry but, in accordance with her customs, retain
the property inherited from her deceased husband. However, "the High Courts
of Bengal, Bombay and Madras held that [the Act and the forfeiture clause]
applied to all Hindu widows, whether or not the validity of their remarriage
derived from the Act. . ,,108 Thus, "outside the jurisdiction of the Allahabad
105. See Prem Chowdhry, Contesting Claims and Counter-claims: Questions of the
Inheritanceand Sexuality of Widows in a ColonialState, in SOCIAL REFORM, SEXUALITY AND
THE STATE, supra note 78, at 79 ("[T]he British acceptance of forfeiture on grounds of
remarriage but not on grounds of unchastity was also tied up with their primary concern about
sustaining the stability of rural society in the region ....
106. See Carroll, supra note 90, at 4.
All rights and interests which any widow may have in her deceased husband's
property by way of maintenance, or by inheritance.., shall upon her remarriage
cease and determine as if she had then died; and the next heirs to her deceased
husband or other persons entitled to the property on her death, shall thereupon
succeed to the same.
Id.
107. See Chowdhry, supranote 105, at 69 ("[T]he Allahabad High Court... consistently
held that Section 2 of the Hindu Widows' Remarriage Act of 1856 ...was not applicable to
castes where customary law permitted widow remarriage prior to its enactment.").
108. Carroll, supra note 90, at 5.
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High Court, this humanely-inspired statute was retrogressive in its social
effects."' 0 9

In India, property and sexual control were key aspects of the control of
widow remarriage because of the customary (albeit artificially constructed)
notion that marriage did not entail a separate entity, but the woman joined the
husband's family. Thus, a widow who sought to leave by remarriage and take
her property with her threatened to decrease the husband's family's property.
In England, the common law historically gave women some (albeit not equal)
rights to property subject to the husband's control under the entireties theory of
marriage. But after her husband died, the widow was a problem, not just a
potential problem, because she regained her independence. In England, the
goal was to get women remarried so they would cease to be a burden to their
children or their own families. It was no surprise, therefore, that the colonial
authorities saw widow remarriage as a benefit and that forfeiture of the
widow's claim on her deceased husband's estate was an easy answer. She was
always entitled to a right to support and it mattered little whether that support
came from an estate or her second husband.
Native elites and the Indian patriarchal power structure were the primary
beneficiaries of the Widow Remarriage Act. By ceding authority to define
family relations along English lines, the colonial authorities perpetuated the
joint family structure and participated in the Hinduization that caused most of
the widow problems in the first place. But the solution of forfeiture was not the
right answer. Nowhere was the Indian woman's interest in sexual autonomy
and control over property protected. And British feminists did not provide the
vision and protection they claimed because they accepted the English norm that
unattached women-redundant women-were a problem. They felt it was
better to be the queen of one's own home than to be a hermit cloistered in the
home of one's deceased husband, even if the former meant relinquishing claims
to his estate.
VI. Abortion andFemale Feticide in Post-ColonialIndia
Abortion reform in England and India occurred in the late 1960s and early
1970s, but the differences in social context between the two countries again
make the comparison of the reforms particularly interesting. In England,
abortion had been heavily regulated and restricted within a predominantly
Christian ideology that stressed the sanctity of life and the notion that life
109. Id.at 24. For an interesting economic analysis of the failure of the Act, see Dasgupta
& Mukherjee, supra note 101, at 1.
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begins at conception. In India, social battles between pro-abortion and antiabortion advocates never reached the feverish level found in England and
America. Thus, when India faced profound population pressures, the move to
legalize abortions was virtually unopposed. In India, the abortion debate did
not pit women's rights against fetal protections, but rather presented abortion as
social policy and population control.
In India, however, when these population pressures created a favorable
environment for loosening abortion restrictions, the Indian Parliament simply
adopted the same law that had been adopted four years earlier in England.110
Rather than assess the different needs of the two countries, Indian lawmakers
fell back on their colonial past and imported a law created out of a different
context to deal with a different set of needs. And not surprisingly, the law has
proven unable to deal with the unique situation in India of an ingrained
patriarchy that favors male over female children. Consequently, liberal
abortion policies have resulted in widespread female feticide-often forced on
unwilling mothers by dominant family members who want to avoid the costs
associated with female children, with some even believing they are doing girls a
favor by relieving them from the fate of growing up in such a patriarchal
society. Without any notion of abortion as an element of women's autonomy
and control over their own reproductive functions, abortion in India has become
a tool that wittingly and unwittingly reproduces colonialism and patriarchy.
Prior to the twentieth century, abortions in England were generally
regulated through laws on murder and infanticide, especially when the mother
died as a result of the procedure.'
In 1938, in a widely publicized case
involving the rape of a fourteen-year-old girl, therapeutic abortions were
accepted both for cases threatening the life of the mother, as well as her mental
health."l 2 Ultimately, the medical profession became the guardians in
determining the indications for medical abortion, and they led the gradual
erosion of legal restrictions by finding that numerous physical and mental
effects were legitimate medical grounds for performing an abortion." 3 In 1967,
therapeutic abortions were legalized by statute, and the grounds for an abortion
were liberalized beyond the woman's life and health. 1 4 The 1967 Abortion
110. See infra note 130 and accompanying text (discussing the Medical Termination of
Pregnancy Act of 197 1).
111. See JOHN KEOWN, ABORTION, DOCTORS AND THE LAw 38 (1988) (stating that doctors
of the time found abortion on par with infanticide).
112. See id. at 52 (describing how the case changed the perception of abortion in England).
113. See id. at 84 (recognizing that legal challenges by doctors brought legal thought and
medical thought onto the same page).
114. Abortion Act, 1967, 15 & 16 Eliz. 2, c. 87 (Eng.).
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Act provided that no one shall be guilty of an offense relating to termination of
a pregnancy when continuation of the pregnancy "would involve risk to the life
of the pregnant woman, or of injury to the physical or mental health of the
pregnant woman, or any existing children of her family, greater than if the
pregnancy were terminated."'" 15 The Act also legalized abortion for eugenic
the child, if born, would suffer from
reasons if there is a substantial risk that
16
serious physical or mental handicaps.!
In 1974, the Report of the Committee on the Working of the Abortion Act
noted that women at that time were less willing to suffer unhappiness or pain
with a spirit of resignation and hopelessness that had often accompanied
unwelcome and debilitating child-bearing.1 7 Many women preferred to follow
careers rather than devote themselves exclusively to family life."18 Economic
pressures, changes in sexual attitudes, and a reluctance passively to accept
medical decisions moved society toward greater freedom in procuring
abortions. 19 The medical profession resented the intrusion of the law into their
professional judgments. 120 Interestingly, the pro-abortion advocacy group, the
Abortion Law Reform Association, was formed in 1936, while its counterpart,
the Society for the Protection of Unborn Children, was not formed until 1967,
when the law was being debated. 12 ' In general, the Report noted that
on the relief of suffering of
ideological differences in 1967 focused primarily
122
life.
of
sanctity
the
on
than
rather
individuals
Abortion reform in twentieth century England focused on the improved
quality of life for women and the appropriateness of medical professionals to
make these decisions. 123 Lawmakers were quite aware that women demanded
115.

Id. § l(1)(c).

116.

Id. § l(1)(d).

117.

See COMMITTEE ON THE WORKING OF THE ABORTION ACT, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
ON THE WORKING OF THE ABORTION ACT, 1974, Cmnd. 5579, at 4 (describing how an unwanted

pregnancy harmed the quality of life of the expectant mother and that an abortion could make a
broader future of possibilities available to her).
118. See id.(acknowledging that British women increasingly favor a career over
exclusively raising a family).
at 5 (asserting that increased numbers of women in the workplace, a shift of
119. See id.
sexual intercourse from procreation to recreation in nature, and the woman demanding an
abortion against the recommendation of a doctor moved the public opinion in favor of a more
liberal abortion policy).
(noting that doctors in the United Kingdom do not like government regulation
120. See id.
of their profession).
121.
122.

Id.at 7.
Id.at6.

123.

(explaining that doctors believed they were inadequately protected by the law
See id.

when they aborted a fetus for therapeutic reasons before the Act and that quality of life of
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control over their reproductive decisions, and while women were willing to
allow doctors to influence that decision, they generally were not willing to have
lawyers or judges make that decision. 124 Moreover, the eugenic concerns
cannot be understated. In the late twentieth century, with dual career
households as the norm, it became increasingly difficult to expect women to
sacrifice their careers in order to care for severely handicapped children. But
while debates between pro-choice and anti-abortion forces continue unabated
today in the West, usually pitting women's rights and autonomy against fetal
protections, abortion in India routinely occurs without the least ripple of
opposition.
Abortion was not regulated in India during the pre-colonial period.125 But
in the nineteenth century, induced abortion became illegal in India, unless
"medically indicated to save the life of a pregnant woman," as governed by the
Indian Penal Code and the Code for Criminal Procedure. 126 Anyone who
performed the miscarriage with an intent to terminate the pregnancy and
without a view to save the life of the pregnant woman was liable for
punishment, including the mother herself127 However, as in England, illegal
abortions were routinely conducted, which had an adverse effect on maternal
28
mortality. 1
Abortion was legalized in India by the Medical Termination of Pregnancy
(MTP) Act of 1971 .129 This Act was a virtual copy of the 1967 English law,
giving the same therapeutic and eugenic grounds for an abortion. 130 And the
women justifies abortion in today's society).
124. See KEOwN, supranote 111, at 38 (discussing how doctors performed abortions regularly in
the United Kingdom despite the possibility of punishment from the legal system).
125. See Siddhi Hirve, Policy andPractice,SEMINAR 532, Dec. 2003, at 14 (stating that abortion
law in India began with nineteenth century British law).
126. See Amar Jesani & Aditi Iyer, Women andAbortion,28 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 2591,2591
(1993) (describing when an abortion could be obtained before the Medical Termination of Pregnancy
Act passed).
127. See Hirve, supra note 125, at 14 (maling clear that both the doctor and the mother were
criminally liable for an abortion in the United Kingdom during the nineteenth century).
128. Nevedita Menon, The Impossibility of "Justice"." Female Foeticide and the Feminist
Discourse on Abortion, in SOCIAL REFORM, SEXUALITY AND THE STATE, supra note 78, at 375
(identifying the maternal mortality rate in India as the second highest in the world).
129. Id.
130. The MTP Act allows termination of pregnancies under the following conditions: (a) if the
continuance of the pregnancy involves a risk to the life ofthe pregnant woman or a grave injury to her
physical or mental health or (b) "there is a substantial risk that if the child were bom, it would suffer
from such physical or mental abnormalities to be seriously handicapped." The Medical Termination of
Pregnancy Act, 1971, No. 34, Acts of Parliament, 1971 § 3(2)(b), available at http://
nrcw.nic.in/shared/sublinkimages/25.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2008) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review). Qualifying these conditions, it is added that a pregnancy caused by rape would
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law passed with essentially no dissent. 3' There were two main forces behind
the move for liberalization of abortion: the demographers who saw abortion as
a means of ending unwanted pregnancies and thereby an effective way of
controlling the population growth; and the medical fraternity who were
concerned with the way illegal abortions conducted by nonqualified and
untrained medical professionals under unhygienic conditions had an ill effect
on women's health. 32 The primary reason for liberalizing abortion, as cited by
the Shantilal Shah Committee, was to put an end to unsafe and illegal abortions
taking place in India, but it was quite evident that the government, which cast
poverty and other related problems as a function of over-population, was also
interested in decreasing the birth-rate. 33 Abortion was seen as another mean
that could be employed, alongside
the distribution of contraceptives, for
34
1
growth.
population
controlling
The parliamentary debates surrounding the MTP bill echoed these
concerns of population control and limiting unsafe abortions.135 On the whole,
"there was no serious anti-abortion stream of opinion in India," to challenge the
government's claims that abortion was an appropriate method for limiting
population. 36 And none of the pro-abortion voices took a stance on the
grounds of women's reproductive rights. 137 Thus, in its current form, the MTP
Act does not grant women the "right" to abortion but simply permits abortion
under certain circumstances, usually as determined by a doctor.'3 8
amount to "grave injury to the mental health" of the woman and hence can be aborted. Id. § (3(2)(b)
explanation 1. Similarly ifthe pregnancy is a consequence of the "failure of any device or method
used by any married woman or her husband for the purpose of limiting the number of children"
it constitutes an injury to the mental health of the woman and can be terminated. Id. § 3(2)(b)
explanation 2.
131. See Menon, supra note 128, at 375 (discussing that only two members of parliament
(MPs) opposed the bill, both on the ground that aborting the child is equivalent to murder).
132. See Jessani & Iyer, supra note 126, at 2592 (describing how demographers and
doctors, guided by their own interests and beliefs, pushed for the Medical Termination of
Pregnancy Act).
133. See Menon, supranote 128, at 375 (acknowledging that, despite the express language
of the report, population control was not the goal of the recommendations, several MPs stated
that the real objective of the recommendations was controlling the population).
134. See id. (reviewing MP Savitri Shyam's remarks that the family planning program of
the government was unsuccessful and that abortion is another method of controlling the
population).
135. See id. (providing the statements of MPs Savitiri Shyam and J.M. Gowder).
136. Id.
137. See id. at 383 (declaring that the spirit of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act is
not rooted in a concern for women's health or individual freedom).
138. See id. (noting that the doctor has complete discretion).
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Unlike in the Anglo-American West, which acknowledges women's rights
to abort for whatever reason, the Indian law gives a privileged position to
medical practitioners who "mediate women's access to abortion services"
including determining if the pregnancy can be terminated or not. The "overall39
mindset of the state is to 'control' rather than 'facilitate' abortion services."
Generally, where the law facilitates women's autonomy and control over
reproductive decisions, statistics show that abortions decline as women become
more adept in contraceptive use. 14 0 But this is not so in India where women
have little or no control over the decision to become pregnant or the decision to
abort.' 4' The Act has contributed little to women's rights.
In 1975, the All India Institute of Medical Sciences developed the method
of amniocenteses for determining fetal abnormalities. 42 One result of this test
was that the sex of the fetus could be known, which has inadvertently resulted
in the abortion of a high percentage of female fetuses. 143 By 1985, the
government had issued three circulars making it a penal offense to use prenatal
sex determination techniques, but "the ban on the use of this technology in
44
government institutions led to its privatisation and commercialisation."'
Private sex determination clinics opened all over the country and, as many
scholars have noted, even those areas which had a paucity of potable water and
electricity had sex determination clinics.145 People were willing to pay large
46
amounts to know the sex of their fetus and to terminate it if it was female.

139. Hirve, supra note 125, at 16.
140. See D. Sundaram, Development and Population Growth in India: Issues of Women
and Fertilityfor Ideology and Action, in CHANGING STATUS AND ROLE OF WOMEN IN INDIAN
SOCIETY 83, 87-89 (C. Chakrapni & S. Vijaya Kumar eds., 1974) (discussing greater declines in
fertility once antinatalistic behavior becomes common).
141. See RAJESWARI SUNDER RAJAN, THE SCANDAL OF THE STATE: WOMEN, LAW, AND
CITIZENSHIP INPOSTCOLONIAL INDIA 183 (2003) (asserting that infanticide of female babies
continues to express the misogynist position of Indian society).
142. See Menon, supra note 128, at 376 (discussing the experimentation leading to the
development of testing discovering abnormalities).
143. See id.(noting that the majority of people who discovered the fetus was female
aborted the fetus); see also D.V.N. Reddy, Amniocentesis: Legal Implications, in CHANGING
THE ROLE OF WOMEN ININDIAN SOCIETY, supranote 140, at 127-34 (discussing the movement
to regulate amniocentesis because of the predominance of female feticide).
144. Menon, supranote 128, at 376.
145. See id. (stating that rural areas without basic health vaccines valued the sex selective
abortion technology).
146. See id.(describing poor workers taking out high interest loans to know the sex of an
unborn child).
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Sex selection is not a new concern for Indian women. 147 Before independence,
it was practiced in the form of female infanticide. 148 Infanticide itself was linked to
other forms of violence, which women were subjected to in their later lives. 149 The
practice of female infanticide was noted and documented by British officials and, as
a result, the practice was outlawed in colonial India by the Infanticide Act of
1870.150 But as a result of sex determination technology, there has been a growing
movement to abolish sex-selective abortions. 15 As a result of rigorous protest, the
Prenatal Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation and Prevention of Misuse) Act was
passed in 1994.152 The Act requires the registration of all facilities and equipment
that may be used in prenatal sex determination. 53 It focuses on the regulation and
control of the techniques used in prenatal sex determination,
ostensibly without
154
adversely affecting women's access to abortion.
Despite the seemingly positive legislation, however, the practice of female
feticide continues to take place illegally in many regions of the country.5 s
Moreover, the implication of the Act, if applied, to the women who have
terminated their female fetuses has proved paradoxical.1 56 Laws which allow
147. See Rita Patel, The Practice of Sex Selective Abortion in India: May You Be theMotherofa
Hundred Sons 2 (Jan. 12, 2007), availableat http://gi.unc.edu/research/pdf/abortion.pdf("Although sex
selective abortion is a fairly recent phenomena, its roots can be traced back to the age old practice offemale
infanticide.") (unpublished Master's thesis, University of North Carolina Chapel Hill) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
148. Id.
149. See id.(discussing the practice ofa widow killing herself at her husband's funeral).
150. In 1871, British lndia had its first census survey, and it was noted that the ratio offemales to
males was 940 to 1000. This surprised the colonial authorities because in England and other European
countries women outnumbered men. Despite laws outlawing female infanticide, the situation has not
changed; in the last census conducted in 2001, the number of females to males was 933 to 1000 across
India as a whole. The rural ratio was 946 women to 1000 men, while in urban areas it was 900 to 1000.
This deficit, coined as the "missing" women problem, has been exacerbated by the practice ofsex selective
abortions. Id; Leela Visaria, The Missing Girls, SEMINAR 532, Dec. 2003, at 24, available at
http"/www.india-seminar. com/2003/532/532%2Oleela%20visariahtma (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
151. See Patel, supra note 147, at 13 (stating that the feminist demands pressured the Indian
government to ban prenatal sex determination in public hospitals).
152. Idat 14.
153. The Pre-Natal Diagnostics Techniques (Regulation and Prevention ofMisuse) Act, 1994,No.
57, Acts of Parliament, 1994, availableat httpl/nrcw.nic.in/Shared/sublindmages/78.htm (last visited
Feb. 22, 2008) (restating the Act's requirement that flicilities and equipment used in prenatal sex
determination be registered) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
154. Id.
155. See Visaria,supranote 150, at 29 (showing that legislation is not succeeding in stopping sex
selective abortions).
156. See Menon, supranote 128, at 378 (pointing out that a law against female feticideis likely to
conflict with abortion laws).
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abortion cannot prevent female feticide, and those which are designed to
prevent feticide can be invoked against the right of abortion itself 157
Abortion reforms in India point out the danger of importing laws aimed at
solving one country's problem into another country facing very different
problems. In England, abortion was primarily an issue about women's quality
of life, accompanied by a rise in the domination of the medical profession. But
the discourse of women's rights was strongly articulated, and the law in
practice has resulted in relative autonomy for women to make reproductive
decisions. In India, population pressures and infanticide led to a liberalization
of abortion laws, which had quite negative results for women. Pregnant women
have very little autonomy under the Indian law, both because of medical control
over the decision to abort and the lack of a popular demand by women for
reproductive rights. The continuing patriarchal property and family laws, in
conjunction with the joint family, leaves many young wives in disempowered
positions, susceptible to the pressures of husbands and families to abort female
fetuses. In countries that have a strong feminist tradition, the law must
accommodate demands by women that they have legally enforceable rights. In
countries like India, the same law that could empower women easily became a
tool to further control their lives.
VII. British Feminists, ColonialAuthorities, andNative Elites
Negotiate the Female Body
The history of most gender relevant law reform in India during the
colonial period has been a tussle for determining the contours of the public and
the private. 158 On the one hand, nationalist politics described the private sphere
as a sphere of autonomy for the Indian male, which itself was a product of the
colonial construction of the Indian space. On the other hand, the reformist
interventions by the colonial state tried to bring into public scrutiny the
problems of the private. Many of the reforms that took place in India and
expressed through legislation were those that concerned the lives of women in
the private sphere but had very little effect on improving women's actual lives.
Moreover, internal struggles within England over women's rights to make
family and reproductive decisions spilled over into Indian reforms because
157. See id.(citing an abortion activist that concedes that the two issues of female feticide
and abortion cannot be separated easily).
158. See RATNA KAPUR, EROTIC JUSTICE: LAW AND THE NEW POLITICS OF POSTCOLONIALISM
30 (2005) (discussing the implications of the public and private divide over law reforms and
sexuality issues).
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India was so forcibly present in the British imagination of the pre- and postcolonial periods.
Colonial authorities, native elites, and British feminists were engaged in a
struggle over the power to define an authentic Indian tradition and culture as
well as the proper parameters of gender within England and India. The
Contagious Diseases Acts, age of consent laws, widow reversion, sati, and
abortion are just a few of the targets of law reform that pitted these groups
against each other in the struggle to define the appropriate contours of the
private sphere. In no instance did one particular group ultimately control the
reform discourse and the outcome of the reform. Each of these groups had to
negotiate the interests of the others, learning to frame the reform issues in ways
that would resonate with the others. As the colonial authorities were trying to
appease the native elite by ceding authority to make laws governing the private
sphere, they were pressured by British feminists to interfere and rework the
Indian family. And while the British spent a lot of time talking about their
civilizing mission, they ultimately did very little, and often what they did
accomplish was to undo some of the structures and expectations that they had
imposed on the Indian family in the first place. What is most notable, however,
is that while British feminists and the colonial authorities were running to the
defense of the Indian woman, to protect her from Indian men, they could not
see her as an autonomous individual. 159 The entire colonial mission was, in
many ways, predicated on righting the wrongs of Indian women, a group never
consulted and never viewed as able to construct its own identity.
The age of consent and widow reversion controversies brought the two
patriarchal forces, the native elite and the colonial rulers, in a head-on
confrontation mainly for political legitimacy in an environment of growing
Indian nationalism. And women and their sexuality became the ground for this
confrontation. Indeed, the native resistance to the Age of Consent Bill rested
on the argument that such regulation of consummation of marriage was a direct
interference in the private lives of the natives, and was therefore
unwarranted. 160 And while the East India Company authorities certainly had
little concern for child-brides or child-widows, after 1858, it would be difficult
for the English government to justify its sovereignty over a nation that
subjected young girls to such a fate. England's own imperialist justifications
159. See BURTON, supranote 15, at 31 (explaining different ways the British feminists saw
the Indian woman as representing a method of attaining her own freedom and selfrepresentation).
160. See KAPUR, supranote 158, at 29-36 (describing the controversy over India's cultural
norm of early child marriage against the backdrop of India's resistance against Britain's
involvement in the "private" sphere of the family).
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would crumble as its legitimacy was questioned by women within their home
country.
Spurred in great part by a British feminist discourse of civilization and
enlightenment that pervaded the mid- and late-nineteenth century English
landscape, colonial authorities used the oppression of women that existed
within the religious codes and customary laws to legitimize their nationalist and
imperialist mission. 16' Thus, gender discourse became the subject of colonial
reform before Indian women even rallied to demand rights or before a women's
movement was really born.162 To a certain extent, therefore, the legitimizing
power of the gender discourse to the colonial mission ultimately led British
authorities to co-opt women's rights discourse to serve their own ends. Not
surprisingly, the outcomes benefited British interests and not Indian women's
interests. Even after Indian independence, the interplay of the gendered and
religious legacies of colonial rule have defined the legal landscape of the
women's reform movement both in secular and religious spheres, creating a
space for certain reforms to progress relatively rapidly while other reforms,
primarily in the sphere of domestic and familial relationships, remain
embedded in an artificial and patriarchal discourse of a pre-colonial Indian
identity that never really existed.
Throughout these reforms, Victorian notions of womanhood and
domesticity guided the discourse on family law and gender. And while the
civilizing mission articulated the goal of emancipating Indian women from their
degraded status, the ultimate beneficiaries were English women and their
households. As British feminists sought to give Indian women a kind of
idealized domestic femininity and power, they did so in order to break those
bonds for themselves. While they applauded the middle-class ideals of sexual
restraint, domesticity, and Victorian womanhood, they demanded political
power and public legitimacy for themselves.
Finally, while the British were busy trying to redefine the pluralist Indian
culture into a hegemonic religious one, they were also busy trying to redefine
the religious private sphere in secular terms. This contradiction in the colonial
mission has lead to a modern India in which Hindu, Muslim, and Christian
women experience profound differences in legal rights and political agency.
The British willingness to cede authority in the private realm calls into question
their commitment to human rights and women's interests.

161. See id. at 29 (providing examples of feminist writings that justified Britain's
imperialism).
162. See id. at 30 (giving examples of how these same feminist arguments continue to be
used today in feminist rhetoric).
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The abortion reforms show just how great the colonial influence has been
on post-colonial India and the problems inherent in once again using women's
bodies to negotiate political ends. Until recently, India has lacked a strong
feminist tradition to demand that laws affecting women's lives actually take
into consideration women's interests. Even today, the legacy of that absence is
that patriarchal and nationalist concerns trump claims for women's rights.
Abortion reform in England, that was primarily rights-based, is not without
controversy. But the reform in India, that was socialist and nationalist at heart,
resulted in women's autonomy being denied and women's interests being
subsumed into the greater goal of imagining a modern India that somehow
retains its traditional character.
Even today, most judges and Indian lawmakers are trained in England, in a
legal model that does not have the flexibility to deal with the pluralist traditions
of modern India nor with the colonial legacy that remains embedded in the
Indian state. As they rely on narrowly-defined legal principles and procedures,
garnered from their ultimately secular past, their narrow views of evidence and
civil procedure result in differential treatment for different women victimized
by Indian men, Indian culture, and a hegemonic legal system that does not
recognize their rights. What rights do exist within the secular Indian state are
largely unexercised by Indian women because of religious and cultural norms
that were historically constructed and artificially imposed. In the end, Indian
women will not be able to rise above these conditions until their feminist
groups understand the inherent patriarchal and colonial underpinnings of many
of their gender-based laws.

